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From Parameters, Autumn 1996, pp. 81-92. .
"We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs . . . are changing the face of
war and how we prepare for war." --William Perry, Secretary of Defense
Information warfare (IW) represents a rapidly evolving and, as yet, imprecisely defined field of growing interest for
defense planners and policy-makers. The source of both the interest and the imprecision in this field is the so-called
information revolution--led by the ongoing rapid evolution of cyberspace, microcomputers, and associated information
technologies. The US defense establishment, like US society as a whole, is moving rapidly to take advantage of the
new opportunities presented by these changes. At the same time, current and potential US adversaries (and allies) are
also looking to exploit the evolving global information infrastructure and associated technologies for military purposes.
The end result and implications of these ongoing changes for international and other forms of conflict are highly
uncertain, befitting a subject that is this new and dynamic. Will information warfare be a new but subordinate facet of
warfare in which the United States and its allies readily overcome their own potential cyberspace vulnerabilities to
gain and sustain whatever tactical and strategic military advantages might be available in this arena? Or will the
changes in conflict wrought by the ongoing information revolution be so rapid and profound that the net result is a new
and grave threat to traditional military operations and US society that fundamentally changes the future character of
warfare?
In response to this situation and these uncertainties, in January 1995 the Secretary of Defense formed the IW Executive
Board to facilitate "the development and achievement of national information warfare goals." In support of this effort,
RAND was asked to provide and exercise an analytic framework for identifying key IW issues, exploring their
consequences and highlighting starting points for related policy development--looking to help develop a sustainable
national consensus on an overall US strategy for information warfare.
To accomplish this purpose, RAND conducted an exercise-based framing and analysis of what we came to call the
"strategic information warfare" problem. Involving senior members of the national security community as well as
representatives from national security-related telecommunications and information systems industries, the exercises led
participants through a challenging hypothetical IW crisis involving a major regional political-military contingency.
The exercise methodology, known by the label "The Day After . . . ," had been previously used for a variety of nuclear
proliferation, counterproliferation, and related intelligence studies. The specific scenario chosen for the exercise
involved a turn-of-the-century conflict between Iran and the United States and its allies, focused on a threat to Saudi
Arabia.
The exercise was conducted six times in evolving versions over the course of five months from January to June 1995.
Each iteration allowed for refinement of basic strategic IW concepts and provided further insights about their national
security implications. This process provided an opportunity to assess and analyze the perspectives of senior
participants from government and industry regarding such matters as the plausibility of strategic IW scenarios such as
the one presented, possible evolutions in related threats and vulnerabilities, and the phrasing of key associated strategy
and policy issues. It also provided an opportunity to identify emerging schools of thought and, in some cases, a rough
consensus on next steps on a number of important strategic IW issues. In addition, the process yielded a badly needed
multi- dimensional framework for sharpening near-term executive branch focus on the development of strategic IW
policy, strategy, and goals--in particular regarding the implications of prospective major regional contingencies on

defensive IW strategies, doctrines, vulnerabilities, and capabilities. It also provided a very useful forum for beginning
to coordinate with industry on the future direction of IW-related national security telecommunications strategy.
As can be inferred from the foregoing, the methodology employed in the study appears to offer particular advantages
for addressing many of the conceptual difficulties inherent in this topic. The subject matter is new and, in some
dimensions, technically complex, especially for individuals typically found in policymaking positions. The challenge of
finding techniques for accelerating efficiently the process of basic education on the topic and its implications for
national security policy and strategy cannot be overstated.
This article summarizes the results of the study. It:
describes and frames the concept of strategic information warfare
describes and discusses the key features and related issues that characterize strategic IW
explores the consequences of these features and issues for US national security as illuminated by the exercises
suggests analytical and policy directions for addressing elements of these strategic IW features and issues
What is "Information Warfare?"
Ten years ago the answer to that question from a communications specialist, a codebreaker, or any other member of
the US military or intelligence communities might have been either "What?" or, with a little encouragement, "Oh, you
mean command and control warfare on the battlefield and in the theater, jamming and that other electronic warfare
stuff." Within most of the US defense community today, you would still get an answer not far different from the
preceding definitions of command and control warfare (C2W) or electronic warfare (EW).
In many circles within the US defense and broader international security community, however, the term information
warfare is increasingly being used to encompass a broader set of information-age "warfare" concepts. These emerging
new warfare concepts are directly tied to the prospect that the ongoing rapid evolution of cyberspace--the global
information infrastructure--could bring both new opportunities and new vulnerabilities. The study focuses on one of
these vulnerabilities: the prospect that this revolution could put at risk high-value national assets outside the traditional
battlefield and theater of "over there" power projection in a fashion that affects both US national military strategy and
broader US national security strategy.
We recognize that for some time the term information warfare in common usage will have no more than a general
meaning, one that is recognized to be inescapably dynamic. Information warfare, like the evolving term "strategic
warfare," is at a much too early stage of development to settle on an agreed definition for the concept.
However, we think there is an emerging element of information warfare--one that appears to be common to almost all
currently evolving uses of this term--that warrants identification and definition. We have labeled this emerging realm
of conflict, wherein nations use cyberspace to affect strategic military operations and inflict damage on national
information infrastructures, as "strategic information warfare." As we have portrayed in Figure 1, we believe that
strategic information warfare (in essence the intersection of evolving information warfare and post-Cold War "strategic
warfare" concepts) warrants special recognition and attention as a legitimate new facet of warfare with profound
implications for both US military strategy and overall US national security strategy.[1]

The new cyberspace infrastructure and culture depicted in Figure 1 has, in recent years, evolved almost exclusively
outside the military context (although the contribution of the Defense Department's ARPANET to the origins of the
Internet are well known). As argued elsewhere, the emerging elements and characteristics of cyberspace by their nature
offer new opportunities for information warfare.
On a parallel track, there is the ongoing evolution in international politics, and within that context, the inevitable
evolution of Clausewitz's warfare as an instrument of politics. In this context, new strategic interests are emerging for
the United States and other nations, yielding new strategic dilemmas and new (and old) strategic targets against which
to use leverage--including the threat of use of new (and old) kinds of strategic force. Thus, new strategic threats and
new strategic vulnerabilities surface. It is increasingly clear, as this article seeks to portray, that the evolution in
strategic warfare will include a dimension of cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities worthy of the label "strategic
information warfare."
Strategic Information Warfare
The United States has substantial information-based resources, including complex management systems and
infrastructures involving the control of electric power, money flow, air traffic, oil and gas, and other informationdependent items. US allies and potential coalition partners are similarly increasingly dependent on various information
infrastructures. Conceptually, if and when potential adversaries attempt to damage these systems using IW techniques,
information warfare inevitably takes on a strategic aspect.
Our exercise scenario highlighted from the start a fundamental aspect of strategic information warfare: There is no
"front line." Strategic targets in the United States may be just as vulnerable to attack as in-theater command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) targets. As a result, the attention of exercise participants quickly broadened
beyond a single traditional regional theater of operations to four distinct separate theaters of operation as portrayed in
Figure 2: the battlefield per se; allied "Zones of Interior" (in our scenario, the sovereign territory of Saudi Arabia); the
intercontinental zone of communication and deployment; and the US Zone of Interior.

The post-Cold War "over there" focus of the regional component of US national military strategy incompletely
describes this kind of scenario and is of declining relevance to the likely future international strategic environment.
When responding to information warfare attacks of this character, military strategy can no longer afford to focus on
conducting and supporting operations only in the region of concern. We now require an in-depth examination of the
implications of information warfare for the US and allied infrastructures that depend on the unimpeded management of
information.
The Basic Features of Strategic Information Warfare
The exercises highlighted seven defining features of strategic information warfare:
Low entry cost. Unlike traditional weapon technologies, development of information-based techniques does not
require sizable financial resources or state sponsorship. Information systems expertise and access to important
networks may be the only prerequisites.
Blurred traditional boundaries. Traditional distinctions--public versus private interests, warlike versus criminal
behavior--and geographic boundaries, such as those between nations as historically defined, are complicated by
the growing interaction within the information infrastructure.
Expanded role for perception management. New information-based techniques may substantially increase the
power of deception and of image- manipulation activities, dramatically complicating government efforts to build
political support for security-related initiatives.
A new strategic intelligence challenge. Poorly understood strategic IW vulnerabilities and targets diminish the
effectiveness of classical intelligence collection and analysis methods. We may therefore have to develop a new
field of analysis focused on strategic information warfare.
Formidable tactical warning and attack assessment problems. There is currently no adequate tactical warning
system for distinguishing between strategic IW attacks and other kinds of cyberspace activities, including
espionage or accidents.
Difficulty of building and sustaining coalitions. Reliance on coalitions is likely to increase the vulnerabilities of
the security postures of all the partners to strategic IW attacks, giving opponents a disproportionate strategic
advantage.
Vulnerability of the US homeland. Information-based techniques render geographical distance irrelevant; targets
in the United States are just as vulnerable as in-theater targets. Given the increased reliance of the US economy
and society on a high-performance networked information infrastructure, a new set of lucrative strategic targets
presents itself to potential IW-armed opponents.

Through the course of our exercise-based analysis, policymakers and other experts from the public and private sectors
were prompted to explore the character and consequences of these features. The discussion that follows summarizes
our synthesis of observations made by the exercise participants on the characteristics and implications of these features
for the strategic IW problem. Note that there is a "cascading" effect inherent in these observations--each helps to
create the enabling conditions for subsequent ones.
Low Entry Cost
Interconnected networks may be subject to attack and disruption not just by states but also by nonstate actors,
including dispersed groups and even individuals. Potential adversaries also could possess a wide range of capabilities.
Thus, the threat to US interests could be multiplied substantially and will continue to change as more complex systems
are developed and the requisite expertise is more widely diffused.
Some participants believed that the entry price to many of the IW attack options posited could be raised by denying
easy access to networks and control systems through the exploitation of new software encryption techniques. Other
participants acknowledged that this might mitigate some threats but emphasized that this approach would not remove
other threats to an internetted system by a corrupted insider (systems operator), direct physical attack, or both. It also
would increase the difficulty in developing intelligence related to strategic IW attackers at all three levels of concern:
strategic, operational, and tactical.
Blurred Traditional Boundaries
Given the wide array of possible opponents, weapons, and strategies, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish
between foreign and domestic sources of IW threats and actions. You may not know who's under attack by whom, or
who's in charge of the attack. This greatly complicates the traditional role distinction between domestic law
enforcement, on the one hand, and national security and intelligence entities, on the other. Another consequence of this
blurring phenomenon is the disappearance of clear distinctions between different levels of anti-state activity, ranging
from crime to warfare. Given this blurring, nation-states opposed to US strategic interests could forgo more traditional
types of military or terrorist action and instead exploit individuals or transnational criminal organizations to conduct
"strategic criminal operations."
Expanded Role for Perception Management
Opportunities for IW agents to manipulate information that is key to public perceptions may increase. For example,
political action groups and other nongovernment organizations can use the Internet to galvanize political support, as
the Zapitistas in Chiapas, Mexico, were able to do. Furthermore, the possibility arises that the "facts" of an event can
be manipulated via multimedia techniques and widely disseminated. Conversely, there may be a decreased capability
to build and maintain domestic support for controversial political actions. One implication is that future US
administrations may include a robust Internet component as part of any public information campaign.
Among participants, there was no support for any extraordinary maneuver by the government to "seize control" of the
media and the Internet in response to a probable IW attack. Rather, there was an acknowledgment that future US
administrations might face a daunting task in shaping and sustaining domestic support for any action marked by a high
degree of ambiguity and uncertainty in the area of information warfare.
Lack of Strategic Intelligence
For a variety of reasons, traditional intelligence gathering and analysis methods may be of limited use in meeting the
strategic IW intelligence challenge. Collection targets are difficult to identify; allocation of intelligence resources is
difficult because of the rapidly changing nature of the threat; and vulnerabilities and target sets are not, as yet, well
understood. In sum, the United States may have difficulty identifying potential adversaries, their intentions, and their
capabilities. One implication of this is that new organizational relationships are needed within the intelligence
community and between this community and other entities. A restructuring of roles and missions may also be required.
In the exercises, debate on this problem centered on the need for some interagency structure to allow for coordinated

collection and analysis of "foreign" and "domestic" sources versus the desire to preserve the boundary between foreign
intelligence and domestic law enforcement.
Difficulty of Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment
This feature of warfare presents fundamentally new problems in a cyberspace environment. A basic problem is
distinguishing between attacks and other events, such as accidents, system failures, or hacking by thrill- seekers. The
main consequence of this feature is that the United States may not even know when an attack is under way, who is
attacking, or how the attack is being conducted.
As in the debate over what to do about the dilemmas posed by the strategic intelligence challenge, exercise participants
split on this topic between those who were prepared to consider a more radical mixing of domestic law enforcement
and foreign intelligence institutions and those strongly opposed to any commingling.
Difficulty of Building and Sustaining Coalitions
Many US allies and coalition partners will be vulnerable to IW attacks on their core information infrastructures. For
example, the dependence on cellular phones in developing countries could well render telephone communications in
those nations highly susceptible to disruption. Other sectors in the early stages of exploiting the information revolution
(e.g., energy and financial) may also present vulnerabilities that an adversary might attack to undermine coalition
participation. Such attacks might also serve to sever "weak links" in the execution of coalition plans. Conversely,
tentative coalition partners who urgently need military assistance may want assurances that a US deployment plan to
their region is not vulnerable to IW disruption.
There was general agreement among participants that as the United States develops and refines defensive systems and
concepts of operations or techniques in this area, it should consider sharing them with key allies, but no specific
policies were proffered in the discussions.
Vulnerability of the US Homeland
As noted earlier, information warfare has no front line. Potential battlefields are anywhere networked systems allow
access. Current trends suggest that the US economy will increasingly rely on complex, interconnected network control
systems for such necessities as oil and gas pipelines and electric grids. The vulnerability of these systems is currently
poorly understood. In addition, the means of deterrence and retaliation are uncertain and may rely on traditional
military instruments in addition to IW threats. In sum, the US homeland may no longer provide a sanctuary from
outside attack.
There was a broad consensus among exercise participants that no dramatic measures such as shutting down an
infrastructure would be effective as a defensive measure (and some skepticism as to whether such action would, in
fact, be possible during a crisis). There appeared, however, a broad consensus in favor of exploring the concept of a
"minimum essential information infrastructure" based on a series of federally sponsored incentives to ensure that the
owners and operators had procedures to detect IW attacks and reconstitution measures that minimized the effects of
any one network disruption.
Conclusions--An Elusive Bottom Line on the Threat
Over the course of the exercise series, careful attention was given to the possible solidifying of a bottom line on the
gravity of the cyberspace-based strategic IW threat. Many existing information systems do appear to be vulnerable to
some level of disruption or misuse. At the same time, developments in cyberspace are so dynamic that existing
vulnerabilities may well be ameliorated as part of the natural building of immunities to threats that accompany any
such rapidly evolving entity. However, our dependence on cyberspace and information systems generally is also
growing rapidly--raising unsettling questions as to whether the "immune system" process can keep up and thus prevent
serious strategic vulnerabilities from emerging and being exploited.
We looked for, but did not find, any strong statistical consensus on just where people think we are now on the threat

spectrum portrayed in Figure 3, or where we might be heading. We did observe, however, that over the course of the
exercise, the general perspective on the magnitude of the strategic IW problem almost invariably appeared to move
downward along the continuum of Figure 3. This experience mirrored that of the authors--the more time spent on this
subject, the more one saw tough problems lacking concrete solutions and, in some cases, lacking even good ideas
about where to start.

The features and likely consequences of strategic information warfare point to a basic conclusion: Key national
military strategy assumptions are obsolete and inadequate for confronting the threat posed by strategic information
warfare. Five major recommendations emerged from the exercises as starting points for addressing this shortcoming:
1. Leadership: Who Should Be in Charge in the Government?
Participants widely agreed that an immediate and badly needed first step is the assignment of a focal point for federal
government leadership in support of a coordinated US response to the strategic IW threat. This focal point should be
located in the Executive Office of the President, since only at this level can the necessary interagency coordination of
the large number of government organizations involved in such matters--and the necessary interactions with the
Congress--be carried out effectively. This office should also have the responsibility for close coordination with
industry, since the nation's information infrastructure is being developed almost exclusively by the commercial sector.
Once established, this high-level leadership should immediately take responsibility for initiating and managing a
comprehensive review of national-level strategic information warfare issues.
2. Risk Assessment
The federal government leadership entity cited above should, as a first step, conduct immediately a risk assessment to
determine, to the degree possible, the vulnerability of key elements of current US national security and national
military strategy to strategic information warfare. Strategic target sets, IW effects, and parallel vulnerability and threat
assessments should be among the components of this review. In an environment of dynamic change in both
cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities, there is no sound basis for presidential decisionmaking on strategic IW matters
without such a risk assessment.
In this context there is always the hope or the belief--we saw both in the exercises--that the kind of aggressive
response suggested in this report can be delayed while cyberspace gets a chance to evolve robust defenses on its own.
This is, in fact, a possibility. The healing and annealing of an immune system that is under constant assault, as
cyberspace is and assuredly will continue to be (if only, in Willy Sutton's words, because that's where the money is),

will create the robust national information infrastructure that everyone hopes to use. But it may not. And we are
certainly not there now.
3. Government's Role
The appropriate role for government in responding to the strategic IW threat needs to be addressed, recognizing that
this role--certain to be part leadership and part partnership with the domestic sector--will unquestionably evolve.
Obviously the government performs certain basic preparedness functions, such as organizing, equipping, training, and
sustaining military forces. In addition, the government may play a more productive and efficient role as facilitator and
maintainer of some information systems and infrastructure, and through policy mechanisms such as tax breaks to
encourage reducing vulnerability and improving recovery and reconstitution capability.
An important factor is the traditional change in the government's role as one moves from national defense through
public safety toward things that represent the public good. Clearly, the government's perceived role in this area will
have to be balanced against public perceptions of the loss of civil liberties and the commercial sector's concern about
unwarranted limits on its practices and markets.
4. National Security Strategy
Once an initial risk assessment has been completed, US national security strategy needs to address preparedness for the
threat as identified. Preparedness will cross several traditional boundaries from military to civilian, from foreign to
domestic, and from national to local.
One promising means for instituting this kind of preparedness could involve the concept of a "minimum essential
information infrastructure" (MEII), which was introduced as a possible strategic defensive IW initiative in the exercise.
The MEII is conceived as that minimum mixture of US information systems, procedures, laws, and tax incentives
necessary to ensure the nation's continued functioning even in the face of a sophisticated strategic IW attack. One facet
of such an MEII might be a set of rules and regulations sponsored by the federal government to encourage the owners
and operators of the various national infrastructures to take measures to reduce their infrastructure's vulnerability, to
ensure rapid reconstitution in the face of IW attacks, or both. The analog for this concept is the strategic nuclear
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN). Participants in the exercise found the MEII
construct conceptually very attractive even though there was some uncertainty as to how it might be achieved. An
assessment of the feasibility of an MEII (or like concepts) should be undertaken at an early date.
5. National Military Strategy
The current national military strategy emphasizes maintaining US capability to project power into theaters of operation
in key regions of Europe and Asia. Because of the four emerging theaters of operation in cyberspace for such
contingencies (see Figure 2), strategic IW profoundly reduces the significance of distance with respect to the
deployment and use of weapons. Therefore, battlefield C3I vulnerabilities may become less significant than
vulnerabilities in the national infrastructure. Planning assumptions fundamental to current national military strategy are
obsolete. Consideration of these IW features should be accounted for in US national military strategy.
Against this difficult projection and assessment situation, there is the ever-present risk that the United States could find
itself in a crisis in the near term, facing the possibility of, or indications of, a strategic IW attack. When the President
asks whether the United States is under IW attack--and, if so, by whom, and whether the US military plan and strategy
are vulnerable--a foot-shuffling "we don't know" will not be an acceptable answer. Finally, however, it must be
acknowledged that strategic information warfare is a very new concept that is presenting a wholly new set of problems.
These problems may well yield to solution--but not without the intelligent and informed expenditure of energy,
leadership, money, and other scarce resources, expenditures for which we hope this article will be a catalyst.
NOTE
1. See our more detailed report, also titled Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND, 1996). The present article is drawn from the Summary and Chapter 1. The full text of the study is available at
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